9. THE PARADOX OF NONVIOLENT ACTION
The desperate willingness with which we historically have embraced a life after death
as reward for this death in life is one of the strongest pieces of evidence supporting the
theory of filicide. We know we do not live, not really, so we construct myths to account
for our death in life and to provide hope for release and reward. At the center of the
myths we place the suffering child. Our filicidal dream is that the child rises again
after death. That an image of a son's bloody death on a cross should have become a central
symbol of our civilization indicates something of the extremity of our predicament.
We have the word, the concept, the myth, and the vision to express that dream:
resurrection. Strangely, we do not have the word which logically would be used to express
the first rising, the one that precedes this re-rising depicted in the central myth. That
word, properly, would be: surrection. Perhaps the fact that we do not have that word is
another of those strange instances of hidden knowledge contained within the language. If
our birth is not a true birth but only a birth into death, then birth is not a proper
surrection--so, naively, we do not bother with the word.
Rational analysis is an efficient, effective way of dealing with immediate problems of
physical survival, as science and technology have demonstrated. We have been so impressed
by the solutions to survival problems generated by science and technology that we have
mistakenly assumed that the way of knowledge on which they are based, that of rational
analysis, is adequate and sufficient for all other problems.
Rational analysis has two basic values:
--Survival value, and
--Play value.
The usefulness of rational analysis is, in fact, radically limited to the so-called
physical realm. Once we have established ourselves with a modicum of security and comfort
in that realm by means of science and technology, rational analysis ceases to have
critical, essential value. To the extent that we then attempt to force solutions of
nonphysical problems by means of rational analysis, that way of knowledge itself becomes
dangerous and destructive.
To use Lawrence LeShan's perceptive terminology: rational analysis is a great help in
finding solutions to structural problems--understanding why it is easier to pull a large
piece of wood if it has wheels attached than if it doesn't. But rational analysis is a
great hindrance in dealing with functional problems--traditional psychoanalysis did not
cure anything, it only made it possible for a patient to accept certain fears and
insecurities as normal.
Beyond the point where physical security and comfort are attained, rational analysis
has at most play value. The problem of filicide cannot be solved by rational analysis.
Rational analysis can do no more than demonstrate the existence and nature of the problem.
We cannot stop controlling by controlling more, or better, or differently.
To return to the resurrection metaphor: how can we "rise again" if we have
not yet risen the first time? Why should we die twice to be born once?
Kuo Hsi, Landscape.
That dilemma brings us to paradox. Western civilization has steadfastly refused to
employ tools other than rational analysis over the long term. Language, which is to say,
symbol manipulation in all its forms, has been our chief tool for rational analysis. As
our desire for control has intensified, so has our use of that tool. Along the way we have
experimented with other tools. For several centuries we tried out the many devices of
religion, with mixed results. For several centuries we tried the many devices of art, also
with mixed results. And we still have those tools with us, though we now use them either
for sporadic solace needed in times of crisis, or for entertainment.
We have refined our discrimination of violences in this peculiar progress called
history largely as a result of a long sequence of rational analyses. Historically, two
reactions to analysis of our ways of violence may be discerned. The one encompasses that
set of attitudes called "conservative." Those persons have tended to resist
rational analysis and have opted for the status quo, with a strong tendency to defend the
status quo in either religious or social-elitist terms. Those who have welcomed rational
analysis have tended to do so with as much force as have those who resist it. These
persons display a wide set of attitudes called "liberal." Their behavior
frequently produces political revolution. The point is that both the political right and
the political left are implicated in the ongoing violence which characterizes history.
As has become clear, the entire process of acculturation to which we subject children
is a series of interferences, so many acts of violence committed on the children. But the
end of our filicidal analysis also yielded up the insight that filicide is finally an
internal act of violence. Thus any overt, social response-however well-intentioned-is,
paradoxically, itself only another filicidal act of violence.
Dismissing out of hand the value of that adolescent foolishness known as existential
paralysis, we are then left to learn the discrimination of filicidal violences. At first
glance, we seem to find ourselves in a double-bind. We are damned if we act, and we are
damned if we don't. But notice what happens if we consider the classic double-bind
situation in the light of the theory of filicide. The exquisite pain we derive from any
existential double-bind is only a masochistic variation on the basic filicidal theme of
control: the individual attempts to escape responsibility for his or her own actions by
demonstrating rationally that all action is at best foolish and at worst tragically
painful. Notice that these two possibilities are only philosophical reformulations of the
two basic myths--Orestes with his tragic success, and Oedipus with his tragic failure.
Such a double-bind is possible only for a creature so intent on absolute, perfect answers
that he or she is blinded to all other possible ways of knowing. The fact that we cannot
avoid violence no matter what we do is a fact that the absolutist, writhing in the
wondrous pain of success/failure, is unwilling to accept. Yet, paradoxically, that fact
provides a way out of the filicidal, acculturative conundrum--or at least points toward a
way out.
It is likely that filicide, pretty much in the form we have it today, is going to be
with us for quite some time. As always--whether we recognize it or not--our only choice
will continue to be at what level of violence we choose to exist. It would be easy to
create a filicidal ideology, actually an anti-filicidal ideology--a program of necessary
and desirable reforms of society and the family in order to end the brutality that
children experience. One point for such a program is the idea of letting the children go.
For most people that would be a dangerously threatening suggestion. Other, far more
threatening examples spring readily to mind, the most potent of course being the reform of
child-rearing in such a way that children would be as overtly sexual as they wish--or wish
not--to be from a very early age, both among themselves and with adults. The day when
these and many other reforms are realized is inevitable. To demand such changes now would
itself be rape of the most primitive kind--rape of the minds of millions of concerned,
well-intentioned, loving parents who are very frightened and very confused in their own
lives and who are rearing classically frightened and confused filicidal children.
Both the revolutionary and the reactionary find it possible to act bloodily and to
justify their actions through an extreme form of identification with various patterns of
violence. The revolutionary has an answer to the world's problems and attempts to make the
world over into that answer. The reactionary finds the status quo pleasantly worthwhile
and strives mightily to defend it. One of the pitfalls in the process of discriminating
violences is the construction of one's personality in such a way that the personality
comes to equate itself with the very act of discrimination.
So we take the process of perception one step farther and call it
"apperception." Apperception may be understood as doubly removed
self-consciousness. Put another way, it is thinking thinking about thinking. It is a
nonjudgmental rendering of the self in all its facets, both violent and nonviolent. We
arrive again at paradox: it is the self observed and--another Western heresy--not
interfered with. (The Heisenberg Principle is only an externalization of filicidal
violence down to the quantum realm.)
Turner, Sunrise with Sea Monsters (detail).
In both East and West this kind of apperception, attainable and useful though it is,
has more often than not degenerated into an abdication of individual responsibility. We
retain the form, unaware of the inner vacuity. The range of empty, once magical gesture
proceeds from the simplistic phenomenon of so-called prayer by television evangelists,
through the somewhat more complex structures and poses of the various filicidal religions,
to the thoughtful, troubled, meditative ascetic who physically withdraws from contact with
society.
* * *
Our acts may or may not have meaning. Or they may occur and exist in such a way that
they simultaneously have meaning and do not have meaning. Or in such a way that they
neither have meaning nor do not have meaning. The very high energy levels involved in any
act of physical or mental violence obscure the act and its echoes so thoroughly that
questions concerning whether any of our acts have meaning or not are little more than
clever pastimes for anorganic minds. Yet is that not always, always the question behind
all questions: does my pain matter?
Each answers that question explicitly or implicitly with a life. And each answer is
different. Both the revolutionary and the reactionary answer with a loud "Yes!"
The reactionary says: Yes, my pain matters but there is nothing I can do about it now so I
am acting in such a way as to make it stop when I retire or when I die. The revolutionary
says: Yes, my pain matters and I am acting in such a way as to make it stop either now or
very soon.
* * *
The sixty-third chapter of the Tao Te Ching begins with the radical suggestion:
wei wu wei
the literal meaning of which is:
action not action.
Action without action. Action without interference, without violence. Language resists
such heresy. One translator tried: to act in repose--which conjures up images of carefree
billionaires pushing buttons in Las Vegas penthouses, or time-worn Tibetan yogis pulling
telepathic strings from Himalayan caves.
To act without acting. To interfere without interfering. Analysis stops here because it
cannot deal with the paradoxical possibility of control without controlling. And we are
left--not with silence, but with laughter. In the distance the attentive ear hears the
oh-so-gently mocking, always encouraging sound of laughter from the eternal mystery of
grace.
END